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Abstract

The effectiveness of bilateral agreements in the context of criminal law enforcement remains highly contested.
In the Indonesian context, such bilateral cooperation classifies two modalities of indirect law enforcement
systems, namely, extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLA) in criminal matters. This article attempts to
explain these modalities through a behavioral and rational approach by taking Indonesia’s MLA treaty with
Switzerland and its extradition treaty with the Russian Federation as a case study. From this approach, we
argue that the state’s decision to cooperate implies the adoption of control and consensus models. However,
these two models were induced by political preferences rather than the sole reliance on the maxim aut dedere
aut judicare in criminal laws. At the domestic level, the attitudes of penal entrepreneurship and institutional
arrangement showcase the multifaceted state’s rationality in deciding a treaty design in criminal law
cooperation.
Keywords: behavior, criminal justice cooperation, extradition, mutual legal assistance
Abstrak
Kemangkusan perjanjian kerja sama bilateral antar negara dalam rangka penegakan hukum pidana masih
kerap dipertanyakan. Dalam konteks Indonesia, kerja sama bilateral tersebut terbagi ke dalam dua bentuk
sistem penegakan hukum tidak langsung, yakni ekstradisi dan bantuan hukum timbal balik masalah pidana.
Artikel ini menjelaskan kedua modalitas tersebut melalui pendekatan behavioral dan rasional dengan studi
kasus pada dua perjanjian, yakni bantuan hukum timbal balik dengan Konfederasi Swiss dan ekstradisi
dengan Federasi Rusia. Dari pendekatan tersebut, studi ini memperoleh gambaran bahwa keputusan negara
untuk bekerjasama mencerminkan dua model, yakni kontrol dan konsensus. Kedua model ini cenderung
dipengaruhi oleh manfaat dari segi politis ketimbang legal yang berlandaskan pada maxim aut dedere aut
judicare. Pada tingkat domestik, sikap penal entrepreneurship dan hubungan institusional juga berperan
dalam menjelaskan keputusan negara untuk bekerjasama dengan negara tertentu dalam menegakkan
hukum pidana.
Kata kunci: behavior, ekstradisi, kerja sama pidana, mutual legal assistance,
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I. Introduction
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On February 4, 2019, Yasonna H. Laoly, the Indonesian Minister of Law and
Human Rights, and Karin Keller–Sutter, Switzerland’s Minister of Justice, signed a
bilateral agreement on mutual legal assistance (MLA) between the two countries. The
Indonesian President Joko Widodo himself highlighted this agreement’s significance
in the fight against corruption and money laundering and in the pursuit of asset
recovery. Some regarded this development as a progressive effort as Switzerland has
been renowned for its bank and financial safety and security, which appeal to whitecollar criminals seeking to keep safe their crimes’ proceeds.1
The Indonesian administration has successfully concluded a deal in criminal
matters, at least with one country. Under the domestic legal system, a bilateral
agreement in criminal matters categorizes two indirect law enforcement modalities:
extradition and MLA treaty. Amid these series of efforts, however, the effectiveness
of bilateral agreements in criminal matters is still highly contested. Bassiouni argued
that these types of indirect criminal law enforcement imply several weaknesses,
including the (1) failure to provide an overall framework that integrates all applicable
modalities, (2) heavy dependence on the effectiveness of national legal systems, (3)
lack of a policy that provides continuity and progressive development, (4) placement
of the sole duty on states to act in conformity with treaty obligations without
international constraints, (5) overreliance on bilateralism, (6) failure to provide
a mechanism for the resolution of conflicts arising between states, and (7) lack of
adequate safeguards to ensure “due process.”2 A number of studies also mentioned
several shortcomings of these agreements from a domestic perspective, including
the lack of a clear provision in the Extradition Law, inefficiency of procedures among
law-related institutions, and uncoordinated measures among indirect criminal law
enforcement modalities.3
These contestations against bilateral agreements on criminal matters suggest
the need to closely examine why states are still cooperating bilaterally in criminal
legal enforcement. Instead of focusing on the doctrinal description of bilateral
treaties as a legal instrument, this work explores the state’s rationality in domestic
legal enforcement through these instruments. It employs a rationalist assumption in
international law, arguing that
the state’s interests are determined by its political leaders’ preferences, who take into
account the preferences of citizens and groups according to the particular national
political regime under consideration.4
In explaining this rationality from a macro perspective, three interrelated elements

1
Puteri Hikmawati, “Implikasi Penandatanganan Perjanjian Bantuan Imbal Balik Antara Indonesia
Dan Swiss Terhadap Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Di Indonesia,” Info Singkat Bidang Hukum (Jakarta, 2019).
2
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2014), 530.
3
Alvon Christianto, “Dampak Ekstradisi Terhadap Ekonomi Masyarakat Indonesia: Mahal Atau Manfaat?,” Dialogia Iuridica: Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Dan Investasi 11, no. 2 (2020): 25–45; Eddy Omar Sharif Hiariej, “United Nations Convention Against Corruption Dalam Sistem Hukum Indonesia,” Mimbar Hukum
31, no. 1 (2019): 112, https://doi.org/10.22146/jmh.43968; Rudy Hendra Pakpahan and Aras Firdaus,
“Pembaharuan Kebijakan Hukum Asset Recovery: Antara Ius Constitutum Dan Ius Constituendum,” Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia 16, no. 3 (2019): 369–78; Pisawat Sukonthapan, “Indonesia & Thailand: ‘Maltreatment’/ ‘Forced Labor’/ ‘TIP’ in Fisheries in Indonesia/Thailand,” Indonesia Law Review 6, no. 1 (2016): 38,
https://doi.org/10.15742/ilrev.v6n1.206.
4
Anne van Aaken, “To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘the Limits of International
Law,’” European Journal of International Law 17, no. 1 (2006): 291, https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chi166.
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come into play: law, legalization, and politics. Instead of focusing solely on the legal
element, this work considers the legalization in international law, which is the process
of bilateral agreement formulation, and the political perspective at the domestic level.

II. Models of International Cooperation in Criminal Matters

The question of a state’s rationality in making deals with other states in criminal
matters could be understood through a socio-legal analysis in international law.
Referring to the concept of law and society in the postmodern era exposed by Cotterell,
Sally Engle Merry argues that regarding nations’ legal systems as stable is impossible.5
According to her, fluidity and legal pluralism are contemporary characteristics of
international law, particularly amid its fragmentation and social relation mobility.6
This process is thus important for us to understand the state’s behavior in an
international agreement.7 By taking Indonesia as a case study, we attempt to fill the
gap in the understanding of the behavioral insights in international law by providing
cultural context.8
Following Merry’s line of argument on the socio-legal approach in international
law, this article departs from globalization and the fear of crime as a backdrop
in understanding cooperation in criminal laws. In this sense, globalization is a
multifaceted term that involves various aspects of international relations, namely,
economics, politics, society, and culture.9 In simple terms, Held defines globalization
as “the growing interconnectedness of states and societies” and “the progressive
enmeshment of human communities with each other.”10 From a constructivist point
of view, Giddens emphasizes that globalization is “the intensification of worldwide
social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”11
The nexus between distant localities affects social spaces between one state
and another.12 Specifically, the surfacing of the culture of the fear of crime becomes
relevant as the intensification of interaction moves linearly with the propagation of
this culture. Before one describes the crime phenomenon in globalization, a short
explanation about the fear of crime is relevant. Garofalo defines the fear of crime as

5
Sally Engle Merry, “International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship: Toward a Spatial Global Legal
Pluralism,” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 41, no. Special Issue Law and Society Reconsidered (2015):
151–52, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1059-4337(07)00006-3.
6
Merry, 152; Harold H Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,” Yale Law Journal 106 (1997):
2599–2659; Atip Latipulhayat, “New Face of International Law From Western to Global Construct,” Padjajaran Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 7, no. 1 (2020): 43–63.
7
Ary Aprianto, “World Heritage Convention and Transnational Legal Process to Protect Indonesian Nature,” PADJAJARAN Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 6, no. 3 (2019): 489–510, https://doi.org/I: https://doi.
org/10.22304/pjih.v6n3.a4.
8
Doron Teichman and Eyal Zamir, “Nudge Goes International,” Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal
Studies Research Paper Series No., 20-09, 2020, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530123.
9
Katja F. Aas, Globalization and Crime (London: SAGE Publications, 2007).
10
.’ David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); David Held, “The Changing Contours of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of Globalisation,” Theoria 46, no. 94 (2007), https://doi.
org/10.3167/004058199782485811.
11
Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 64.
12
Sally Engle Merry, “New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law,” Law and Social
Inquiry 31, no. 4 (2006): 975–95, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2006.00042.x; Paul Schiff Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism,” Southern California Law Review 80, no. 6 (2007): 1155–1237, https://doi.
org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.4.110707.172311.
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“an emotional reaction characterized by a sense of danger and anxiety.”13 Conceptually,
Garofalo elucidates two elements of the fear of crime, namely, fear and physical harm
and actual and anticipated fear. Determining the rate of the fear of crime in specific
populations involves several variables that cover the position in a social environment
(related to socioeconomic structure); information and image about crimes; risk
assessment; costs, choices, and responses to the fear of crime; feedback effect; and
social outcomes.{Formatting Citation}14
Extradition and MLA in criminal matters make up two distinct legal regimes. The
first regime is related to an indirect enforcement system, which is a term that implies
the enforcement of international criminal law through the domestic system.15 The
second regime reflects the cooperation between states in criminal and penal matters
that is essentially a modality of cooperation based on bilateral relations to enforce
the states’ domestic legal systems.16 The fundamental principle in both modalities lies
in the maxim aut punire aut judicare, defined as the duty to prosecute criminals. This
principle obligates states to prosecute and try international crime perpetrators and
create cooperation with other states to detain, prosecute, and try individuals.
The practice of extradition and MLA varies between states. On the basis of
Heymann’s observation, Harfield categorizes two distinct models that could explain
the state’s legal attitudes about interstate cooperation in criminal law enforcement.
The first model is the prosecutorial model. In this model, law enforcement apparatuses
create a highly pragmatic structure specifically designed to fulfill the necessities in
legal enforcement procedures.17 This model works on every stage or phase of the
criminal justice system, and according to Harfield, it is often cited as the philosophy
of practical policing. The second model is the international law model, which seeks
to explain the relationship between states and the states’ organs or institutions with
a highly different attitude toward law enforcement. This model is based on strict
international rules, including the criteria for the rejection of requests.18
On the basis of these two models, Harfield further formulates two models of
bilateral agreements on MLA: the control model and consensus model. The control
model finds its argumentation rooted in the United States’ political stance regarding
transnational organized crimes being a threat to its national security. After the 9/11
World Trade Center attack, the security terminology has been redefined in the military,
political, economic, social, and environmental areas, based upon which transnational
organized crimes could operate.19 One particular consequence of this perspective is
reflected by the United States’ positions toward MLA treaty negotiations.20 The benefit
of concluding agreements with other states individually, which reciprocally imposes
obligations, is the United States’ flexibility in fulfilling the specific and detailed
obligations of each state.21 Harfield argues that the relations between individual
13
James Garofalo, “The Fear of Crime: Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 72, no. 2 (1981): 840.
14
Garofalo, 842–53.
15
Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, 487.
16
Ibid., 487.
17
Clive Harfield, “A Review Essay on Models of Mutual Legal Assistance: Political Perspectives on
International Law Enforcement Cooperation Treaties,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied
Criminal Justice 27, no. 2 (2003): 221–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2003.9678710.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., 226.
21
Christopher C Joyner, “International Extradition and Global Terrorism: Bringing International
Criminals to Justice,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 25 (2003): 493–541.
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MLA treaties could be described as a bicycle wheel, with the United States being
the center or hub and with the spokes representing the treaties. Thus, this model
aligns the control exercised by the hub with “the view of mutual legal assistance as an
instrument in an armory intended to protect a single nation from the external threats
posed by transnational organized crime.”22
The second model on MLA treaties is the consensus model. It departs from the
common understanding among the European Union states that consider transnational
crimes as a collective threat toward Europe’s security and economic integration. As a
result, these states view transnational organized crimes as a domestic problem that
ought to be resolved through regional instruments and mechanisms.23 Practically
speaking, the European Union has promoted forums and meetings, studies, capacity
building, and even multilateral treaty formulation.24 The advantage of this approach
is that any concluded norms regionally might not be addressed by bilateral treaties
as these individual instruments were formed to accommodate particular conditions
in two countries as an attempt to provide great flexibility to the power broker in
the bilateral relationship.25 Moreover, this model creates established relationships,
including the uniformity of the procedure of cooperation between countries, which
is often absent from MLA bilateral treaties.26 This approach is understood as a way to
reduce public expenditure for negotiating with many states individually.27
The control model is preferable to the consensus model if the bilateral economic
relationship is asymmetric.28 This model, exercised through a bilateral treaty on MLA,
implies an equal formal legal obligation between state parties. In the absence of a
supranational body or agency to enforce international law and faced by the violation
or infringement of treaties, states with high economic resources could unilaterally
impose sanctions against their counterparts. 29 Nevertheless, the control model tends
to promote unilateralism rather than cooperation.30 However, Nadelmann, as quoted
by Harfield, states that “the principal incentive for many foreign governments to
negotiate MLATs with the United States was, and remains, the desire to curtail the
resort by U.S. prosecutors, police agents, and courts to unilateral, extraterritorial
means of collecting evidence from abroad.”31 Meanwhile, many less powerful states
are prone to focusing on endorsing regularity when negotiating with more powerful
states. According to Harfield, “[I]t is the setting of internationally agreed norms that
is a particular advantage of the consensus model.”32 Specifically, Harfield’s consensus
model and Heymann’s international law model illustrate “the mechanisms by which
the citizen is protected against the abuse of state authorities exceeding their powers.”33
The international law model explicates how to regulate the relations between
jurisdictions, and the consensus model depicts how to achieve expected values by
Harfield, “A Review Essay” 227.
Ibid., 228.
24
Ananya Chakraborty, Extradition Laws in the International and Indian Regime: Focusing on Global
Terrorism (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 49–55, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6397-9.
25
Harfield, “A Review Essay on Models of Mutual Legal Assistance: Political Perspectives on International Law Enforcement Cooperation Treaties,” 230.
26
Harfield, 230.
27
Ibid., 230.
28
Ibid., 231.
29
Ibid., 230–31.
30
Ibid., 231.
31
Ibid., 231.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 232.
22
23
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promoting them among many possibilities between signatories.34

III.Rational Choice and International Law

As mentioned in the discussion of international cooperation in criminal law
enforcement, the two models are not enough to understand the rationality of a
state’s decision to conclude a bilateral treaty in criminal law enforcement. Arguably,
the models should be accompanied by the rational choice approach in international
law. Prior to tackling this approach, we should first understand the discourse of the
rationalist approach in international relations. From this approach, we briefly examine
the logic of rational choice theory in international law. In doing so, we may construct a
clear analytical framework for explaining why a state is willing to conclude a bilateral
agreement in enforcing its domestic criminal laws.
Rationality in international relations is a construction of time or space in which a
state’s actions are being calculated, raison d’etat (i.e., main political reason of a state
in making decisions based on national interest), and a reflection of power balance
caused by these interactions.35 In the application of the concept of rationality to
international relations, rational choice theory explains why and how states take
one particular action. However, this process is not strictly intended to provide a
scientific explanation or be conducted merely for the sake of science. This process
could justify any actions taken as it indicates a predictive dimension by considering
actions and existing environmental settings and then comparing them with those of
any previously taken actions.
The concept of rationality in policymaking and policy choices has a fundamental
assumption that actors interact because they have a purpose, that is, to determine
their specific goals and how to achieve them. They then choose particular actions
that could maximize their utility in achieving their purpose. Rational choice theory
does not see the end but focuses on the means to achieve the end.36 This theory’s
complimentary application is that it could describe, explain, and predict an actor’s
behavior. Within the assumption that every actor always takes the most optimal
action, rational choice theory guides us in understanding that every choice that has
been or will be taken by an actor is based on this actor’s purpose, beliefs, and relevant
environmental constraints, such as information availability and counteraction from
other actors.
In employing a rationalist approach in foreign policymaking, Allison offers the
following three models:
• The rational actor model emphasizes that foreign policy is a purposive act of
unified governments;37
• The organizational process model emphasizes that foreign policy is the output of
large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of behavior; and38
• The governmental politics model emphasizes that foreign policy is a result of

Ibid., 232.
Judith Goldstein et al., “Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,” in Legalization and World
Politics, ed. Judith Goldstein et al. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The MIT Press, 2001), 1–16.
36
Alexander Thompson, “Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls,” The Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2002): 285–306; Alexander Thompson, “The Rational Enforcement
of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma,” International Theory 1, no. 2 (2009): 307–21,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971909990078.
37
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1971), 5.
38
Ibid., 6.
34
35
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various bargaining games among players in the national government.
These models are not flawless, but each of them tends to focus on one aspect
while neglecting others. Therefore, how should we examine the rationality behind
a foreign policy? One might employ multiple models in the same case to gain a
rich understanding. In this article, with the limited source of information from
high-ranking individuals, we only employ the first and second models of analysis,
namely, the rational actor and organizational process models. We should note that
the rationalist approach derives from the realist tradition of international relations
that emphasizes the security perspective and the accumulation of power by actors
engaged in international interactions.
Nonetheless, international law studies tend to be suspicious of political
manipulation in the assumption and definition of the law’s economic analysis. Is the
state rational? What is the nature of such rationality? In answering these questions,
one might seek to employ “narrow” rationality. Narrow rationality is a framework in
which states are rational in their behavior and pursue their interests with some sets of
particular preferences, which they decided not on the basis of an objective standard of
utility or efficiency but, idiosyncratically, on the basis of their own emotional, cultural,
and historical considerations that are difficult to be comprehended by parties outside
the state.”39
The behavioral approach in international law is established through cognitive
psychology and behavioral economics, which principally examines individual action
as a unitary actor.40 One must further justify how this approach could be applied to the
study of international law at the state level. Broude offers three relevant explanations.
The first one is the state as a unitary actor.41 Veering away from the traditional view
of realists, law and economic analysis, and international law practitioners positing
that states are equal to individual agents, Broude argues the need for an exclusion in
the general provisions of human behavior captured through the concept of “bounded
rationality.” According to Broude, a state’s behavior should be exempted from a
perfect rationality point of view. In brief, a lenient behavioral approach to the states
must be adopted because actions taken at the state level are formed by individual
and collective agents.42 He also identifies two ways to explain how states overcome
this bounded individual rationality within them. The first way is to see beyond the
state. He mentioned that “even if states naturally acted according to bounded rather
than ideal rationality, the international political and legal environment in which states
act would somehow have a corrective effect, leading them to become more perfectly
rational.”43 Through this lens, a behavioral analysis in international law could focus
on the examination of the decisions made by the state on different circumstances and
events from a behavioral perspective instead of solely applying the behavioral theory
of states.44 The second way is to see within the state. This approach differs from the
current economic analysis of international law, which accepts that the state is a unitary,
even monolithic, actor. Arguably, the state’s behavior toward international law is an
outcome of complex social, political, administrative, and legislative processes.45 These
39
Tomer Broude, “Behavioral International Law,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 163, no. 4
(2015): 1108–9, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2320375.
40
Anne van Aaken, “Behavioral International Law and Economics,” Harvard International Law Journal
55, no. 2 (2014): 421–81, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2342576.
41
Broude, “Behavioral International Law,” 1122.
42
Ibid., 1122.
43
Ibid., 1122.
44
Ibid., 1124.
45
Ibid., 1125.
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processes, categorized as cognitive biases and heuristics evident, become the factors
that causes the bounded rationality to be manifested at the international level.
The second explanation for the behavioral approach toward state level analysis is
through seeing the behavioral aspects of collective decision making at the state level
and other relevant entities, such as nonstate actors and international bureaucracy,
which produce outcomes in international law.46 Therefore, this view attempts to shift
from methodological statism to decision making at people’s collective level. Various
psychology studies on collective decision making have explained the existence
of behavioral bias in group thinking when deciding politics and foreign policies,
particularly in combination with prospect theory.47 This logic could be applied in
understanding the rationality of group decisions in international law, in which the
group has a certain level of bias and heuristics.48 On the basis of several experiments,
van Aaken argues that group thinking has “a tendency to believe either (1) that the
characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of the group as a whole...
or (2) that a group’s decision outcome must reflect the preferences of individual group
members, even when information is available suggesting otherwise.”49 The third
explanation refers to the individual as a subject and decision maker in international law.
Broude states that “individuals are increasingly direct addressees and beneficiaries
of international law, especially in the areas of investment protection, international
human rights, international criminal law, and international humanitarian law…”50
In the context of criminal law enforcement cooperation, rational choice
theory may open up a venue to showcase how domestic penal policies affect
the government’s decision at the state level. The following sections elaborate
a case study on two distinct bilateral treaties and how they reflect the
multifaceted fields of interaction in deciding on a particular treaty design.

IV. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties: A Case
Study

Under the rational choice framework, the state’s decision to form a design for
extradition and MLA treaties could be regarded as a public policy. Through this lens,
we could consider three public policy-oriented categories.51 The first category is the
law and public policy. In this sense,
the position of the states concerned depends on the legal basis of extradition, that is,
whether in the particular case extradition is based: (i) on a treaty, (ii) on reciprocity,
or (iii) on comity. The choice among these bases stems from the original choice of
two hypotheses to justify the practice, namely civitas maxima or mutual cooperation
between states.52
The relation between law and public policy enshrines several concerns: (i) the choice
of jurisdictional theory; (ii) the requirements of extraditable offenses, interpreted
either in concreto or in abstracto; (iii) the limitations on the extraditability of certain
types of offenses, such as political, fiscal, economic, and military offenses (which

Ibid., 1126.
Ibid., 1127.
48
Ibid., 1129.
49
van Aaken, “Behavioral International Law and Economics,” 446.
50
Broude, “Behavioral International Law,” 1130.
51
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 6th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 49.
52
Ibid., 55.
46
47
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stem more often from policy than from humane considerations even if an element of
the latter is implicit in the formulation of the policy); and (iv) the protection of the
rights of the relator, which includes an inquiry into how jurisdiction was obtained,
the sufficiency of the charge and the evidence presented, and the defenses available to
refute the charges or oppose the grant of extradition.53 The second category comprises
political factors. These factors indicate that the extradition implementation could
be discerned according to political themes and, even to a certain extent, performed
by nonstate actors. 54 Based on rational choice theory, these factors are relevant in
understanding the state’s reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation costs.55 The third
category is the consideration of human rights and humanity. The discourse about
human rights protection has been pervasive in direct and indirect international
criminal law enforcement. The most common issues include the non-extraditable
clauses, rights protection in custody, and fair trial. Many countries have adopted this
rule of noniquiry, in which “courts may not examine the requesting country’s justice
system or human rights record in determining whether to extradite an individual.”56
The theoretical construction of rational choice in international law also helps us
understand the two models’ logic in bilateral agreements related to criminal law. By
taking a case study on two treaties, namely, the MLA treaty with Switzerland and the
extradition treaty with the Russian Federation, this article argues that both formal
agreements depict the consensus and control models. However, from a behavioral
point of view, we find the distinction between the two models as somewhat
superficial because the rationality is formed through collective decision making at
the group level within the state. In the Indonesian context, a concluded international
treaty should be legalized domestically through an act by the parliament.57 Hence,
the government bears a signatory or ratification power, thus leaving the domestic
legalization to the national parliament’s political discussion process.58 In the context
of treaty ratification, the government can provide academic/background paper
during the deliberation process at the parliament. Therefore, one could argue that the
academic/background paper reflects interagency interests or calculations toward the
consequences of a bilateral treaty in criminal matters.59
A. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Switzerland
Long before signing the MLA agreement in 2019, Indonesia and Switzerland have
cooperated against criminal activities using the MLA mechanism. Both countries have
worked since 2005 to recover assets from criminal activities hidden in Switzerland.
A prominent case is related to the effort to repatriate ECW Neloe’s assets.60 ECW
Neloe was convicted of corruption by Indonesia’s Court, and since 2005, Indonesia

Ibid., 56.
William Magnuson, “The Domestic Politics of International Relations,” Virgi 52, no. 52 (2012): 839,
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315189734.
55
Andrew T. Guzman, How International Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008); Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 88–91.
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had been trying to repatriate his assets from Switzerland.61 Only in 2009 did the
case proceed with the freezing of his ECW Neloe’s assets in Switzerland’s banking
system62. After four years of extension, Switzerland authorities opened his account
because of a lack of evidence. In the judicial process, the opening happened because
Indonesia authorities could not confirm whether those assets were obtained through
criminal activities. The conviction for money laundering against ECW Neloe was also
added after Switzerland authorities informed Indonesian authorities that they found
irregularities in ECW Neloe’s accounts.63
The legal process in Indonesia showcases the inability of authorities to trace
crime-related assets. In July 2005, Switzerland authorities were informed about
irregularities, and Indonesia requested the MLA a year after. For asset repatriation,
Switzerland authorities require the proceeds to be stated in a court verdict from the
requesting country; such requirement was not met in ECW Neloe’s case.64 Switzerland
authorities can only freeze assets within a fixed time limit on a request basis;
freezing assets to obtain evidence is inadmissible.65 Issues also arise in linguistics
and terminologies, with terms such as “corruption” not being legally accepted in
Switzerland.66 Repatriating assets could become an obstacle if the interpretation of
crimes related to such assets does not fall under the principle of dual criminality. In
the process, the two countries consented to limit transnational crimes through the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) framework. Nevertheless,
both countries faced challenges with regard to the conduct of cooperation. Thus, both
countries agreed to formalize their cooperation through a bilateral agreement.
In 2015, the negotiation to formalize the cooperation started with the objective to
create a binding foundation for the cooperation between the two countries’ judicial
authorities in relation to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenses and
the effective combat of international crimes.67 As stated in the treaty, the agreement
focused on fiscal offenses that “the Contracting Parties provide each other the widest
measure of MLA in criminal matters concerning fiscal offenses in accordance with
their respective national law.”68 As stated in a report from the Ministry of Law and
Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia, corruption and financial crimes such
as tax crimes and corporate crimes are crimes with a high possibility of being
transnationalized between both countries.69 The agreement also stated that “... both
61
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Contracting Parties places the alleged conduct within the same category of an offense
or denominates the offense by the same terminology...”70 This agreement would
grant both countries control over the building of a common interpretation regarding
criminal activities for which assistance can be requested. To bridge the domestic
law enforcement of the two countries, the agreement also detailed how to conduct
investigations, prosecutions, or judicial proceedings, such as verdict details, request
forms, and transmission channels.
For Switzerland, the agreement may provide a legal framework for law enforcement
institutions to conduct an asset recovery operation against foreign criminals.71 For
Indonesia, the agreement provides norms for law enforcement in conducting legal
actions abroad.72 Moreover, this instrument would accelerate the enactment of laws in
the sectors covered in the agreement but are yet to be regulated under domestic laws,
such as appropriating assets and individual data protection. This agreement thus
provides a mutual framework to advance law enforcement practice against criminal
activities for both countries.

B. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties with the Russian Federation
The discussion to conclude the extradition and MLA treaties on criminal matters
with the Russian Federation commenced in 2016. Several political commitments
between the two countries were formulated since the signing of the joint statement
between the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry on Politics, Law, and Security and the
Russian Federation Secretariat of the Council on Security Affairs Cooperation. In the
joint statement framework, both countries agreed on a number of suitable measures
that cover several aspects of the security field, including maritime security, terrorism
(including terrorist funding and cyber abuse for terrorists’ aims), cybersecurity,
defense, transnational crimes, intelligence, law, and natural disaster management.73
In the legal cooperation section, both countries are “mindful of a need to establish a
strong and firm legal framework in countering law and security problems effectively.”
With regard to this pronouncement, both parties agreed to “find possibilities in
strengthening legal cooperation between the two countries, including by creating
bilateral agreements such as MLA in criminal matters and extradition.”74 This
paragraph instead shows the context in which the two agreements were made from
2018 to 2019. The legal enforcement cooperation is placed under threat to the security
approach that could be settled cooperatively between the two countries through the
establishment of legal instruments based on the framework statement.
In the position paper concluded by the central authority, the decision to design
treaties with the Russian Federation was more of a preventive measure in anticipation
of future crimes than a solution to the ongoing domestic legal enforcement. The
70
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penal entrepreneurs highlighted several anticipated crimes from legal enforcement
interests, such as transnational organized crimes, cybercrime, corruption, and
money laundering.75 This situation shows a lack of prosecutorial approach from
Indonesia’s perspective despite some criminal cases involving Russian citizens, such
as fraudulence, people smuggling, and the 2012 Sukhoi Superjet 100 crash incident
at Gunung Salak, Indonesia.76 From a political point of view, Russia’s reputation in
international forums and organizations seems to be direct leverage for Indonesia’s
credibility at the global scale. In relation to this characteristic, the multipolarity of
today’s international relations pushes Indonesia to be a part of the equation outside
the western-centric perspective.77 This condition is presumably supplemented by the
historical perspective on the long-time relation between the two countries.
In both treaties, we can conclude that Guzman’s 3Rs, namely, reputation, reciprocity,
and retaliation, could be the cornerstone for the rationality behind states’ willingness
to engage in penal cooperation. All parties state that it is through their respective
treaties that reputation could be preserved. The intensification of cooperation
through penal entrepreneurship makes reputation increasingly valuable and allows
for an upward spiral of cooperation, thereby making the states willing to compromise
some aspects of their sovereignty for international commitments.78 A state with a
good reputation for honoring its commitment would be seen as a reliable partner
by other states. This type of reputation made Switzerland willing to sign the treaty
even if they received less benefit than their economic terms. Reputation weighs in the
economic benefits because with a better reputation, the easier it is to enter another
form of cooperation, the easier it is to extract concessions in future cooperation, and
the more states become willing to cooperate.79
Reciprocity in bilateral relations is often sufficient to generate continuous
cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma situation.80 In the first phase of cooperation,
reciprocity acts as the first evaluation that will give a state more benefit, work
bilaterally, or unilaterally? Reciprocity is closely associated with reputation as the
state matches their expectation of reciprocity with another state on the basis of its
reputation. Both treaties reflected that the states acted on reciprocity based on their
reputations: for Switzerland, it was its financial reputation; for Russia, it was its
security reputation. Formalizing their cooperation into treaties means that all parties
agreed for reciprocity such that other parties could not afford to defy it in the future
because of the reputation they sought to build. Reciprocity produces a situation in
which continuing cooperation is more beneficial than terminating it.
The final cornerstone is the retaliation that the state could bear when defying
international commitments. In a rational approach, the state is rational, that is, all
actions are calculated on the basis of benefits. When the state engages in cooperation,
all parties calculate the costs and benefits of defying commitments and determine the
types of retaliation the parties are capable of. Under this description, retaliation only
75
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takes place if it generates some payoff to the retaliating state.81 In retaliation, the state
also hopes to build its reputation on international commitment, and by retaliating,
the state could gain another tool to enforce the treaty. In Switzerland’s treaty, the
asymmetrical relations in economic terms put Switzerland in a higher position than
Indonesia. This condition can explain why Switzerland remained willing to engage in
the treaty despite Indonesia reaping most of the economic benefits.

V. Domestic Rationality: In defense of a treaty and the role
of penal entrepreneurship

The behavioral approach prompts us to further examine the rationality of penal
entrepreneurs as a form of group thinking.82 In terms of indirect international
criminal law enforcement, we could categorize the actors into two authorities: the
central and competent authorities. In MLA and extradition, the Ministry of Law and
Human Rights acted as the central authority. The competent authority comprises
several actors, including the National Police, Interpol, Anti-Corruption Commission,
Court, Attorney General, and Center of Financial Report and Transaction. Outside
the two categories are the parliament, whose role is to represent the public during
the ratification process; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose role is to facilitate
communication with the state counterpart; and the civil society, which is known as
the peer group advocating and campaigning for the fight against crimes.
In the 2014–2019 agenda, the legal system reform prioritized six areas: (1)
enhancing the fair legal enforcement; (2) corruption prevention and eradication; (3)
overcoming illegal logging, illegal fishing, and illegal mining; (4) combating narcotics
and psychotropics; (5) land ownership legalization; and (6) protecting the rights of
children, women, and marginal groups.83 Within the foreign policy sector, a number
of important priorities are maritime diplomacy, the regional arrangement in the
Southeast Asia region, cooperation to resolve transnational organized crimes, and
the significance of participation in the G20 forum.84 Under the security and defense
agenda, the government set the agenda to address border and maritime crime control,
as well as drug abuse and illegal trade.85 However, one should note that the five-year
agenda specifically cited a plan to rediscuss the issue of extradition with Singapore
and the agenda to reclaim the flight information region management above the Riau
Islands from the country. As part of the administration, the central authority is the
sole institution with the mandate and performance target to annually establish at
least one bilateral treaty on extradition and MLA on criminal matters.
Hence, regarding existing bilateral agreements as patterns of behavior is difficult.
On the basis of these existing documents, the decision to create a bilateral agreement
on criminal matters reflects the uncoordinated aims and targets among governmental
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sectors. Incoherency appears to exist between sectoral plans and the decision to
conclude extradition or MLA with individual countries. Domestic institutional
arrangements have instead been focused on transnational crimes’ materiality rather
than the strategic ways to deal with them internationally.86
Nevertheless, an interesting view is that international agreements represent
an alternative effort to join an international forum. Indonesia is currently joining
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international organization that aims
to develop and promote national and international policies to combat money
laundering and terrorist funding. To become a member, Indonesia needs to pass a
series of mutual evaluations, which cite extradition and MLA implementation as part
of the recommendations. According to the 2018 Mutual Evaluation Report, Indonesia
has been largely compliant with extradition and MLA measures. The only minor
shortcoming is that “the need for appraisal by several authorities, which may cause
delays, and the legislation does not provide for simplified extradition mechanisms.”87
In the MLA treaty between Indonesia and Switzerland, the economic relation
between both countries is relatively asymmetric. This relation is viewed not only from
the economic development sector but also from Switzerland’s reputation as a leading
financial center manifested by its banking secrecy practices and precarious but
superior management and technological approaches to its financial system, which has
allowed many assets obtained from criminal activities stored safely in Switzerland.88
As a developing country, Indonesia is in dire need of revenues for its development
agenda, especially given its reputation as a prominent place for tax evasion. The case of
ECW Neloe highlighted how Indonesia’s lack of proper knowledge and infrastructure
could have hindered its asset recovery effort, with Switzerland halting such effort
even with international frameworks in place. Thus, Indonesia was willing to engage
in bilateral agreements instead of relying on the international framework to combat
transnational crimes between both countries.
From a rationalist paradigm, these situations drive Indonesia to employ the
MLA and extradition mechanism as a primary modality as it provides a steady and
predictable outcome, including assistance in exchange for the reformation of domestic
law and law enforcement practices. Strategically, the mechanism benefits Indonesia
more than its counterpart because of the relatively asymmetrical relationship. For
Switzerland, this agreement enhances its reputation as a leading financial center
with good practices; for Russia, it might improve its global commitment to fight
transnational organized crimes.89 For Indonesia, along with asset recovery, the
agreement could also enhance its reputation and fulfill its obligation identified by the
G20 Commitment Against Corruption. By seizing these opportunities, Indonesia can
upgrade its capability of combating transnational criminal activities.90

86
Maskun, “Combating Corruption Based on International Rules,” Indonesia Law Review 4, no. 1
(2014): 55, https://doi.org/10.15742/ilrev.v4n1.74.
87
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), “Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist
Financing Measures: Indonesia Mutual Evaluation Report,” 2018.
88
Ministry of Law and Human Rights Republic of Indonesia, “Laporan Hasil Kajian “Urgensi Pengesahan Perjanjian Timbal Balik dalam Perkara Pidana (Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters) Antara
Indonesia-Swiss”, 2018. (Unpublished) p.4
89
Federal Department of Justice and Police FDJP Swiss Confederation, “Annual Activity Report 2017
Mutual Legal Assistance”, 2018 p. 12. Ministry of Law and Human Rights Republic of Indonesia, “Urgensi
Pengesahan Perjanjian Ekstradisi antara Indonesia dengan Federasi Rusia, 2019.
90
Ministry of Law and Human Rights Republic of Indonesia, “Urgensi Pengesahan Perjanjian Timbal
Balik dalam Perkara Pidana (Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters) antara Indonesia dengan Swiss”,
2018. p.61

Volume 10 Number 2, May - August 2020 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

A Behavioral Approach to Bilateral Cooperation

~ 151 ~

The assessment made herein indicates that engagement in a bilateral agreement
is a plausible option for Indonesia in combating transnational crimes. When
international frameworks such as the UNCAC failed to help Indonesia, as seen in the
ECW Neloe case, Indonesia was left with no other option. The asymmetrical relation
between its financial position and the weakness of domestic institutions’ capabilities
led Indonesia to conclude that the benefits from the agreement would make up for the
cost of conforming to domestic law and law enforcement practices.91
When the rationalist approach is employed, the whole process can be regarded as
two single unit-rational actors interacting with one another. At the domestic level, the
process was actually led by dominant authorities in the financial and fiscal sectors,
that is, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights as the central authority and the Center
of Financial Report and Transaction backed by the Directorate General of the Tax
Ministry of Finance as the competent authority. In a report by the Ministry of Law and
Human Rights related to the MLA agreement with Switzerland, much emphasis was
placed on the roles of both authorities. For the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, this
agreement would strengthen its position as the central authority for international law
enforcement cooperation, which had been contested by the Office of the Attorney and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As for the Center of Financial Report and Transaction, the
agreement would strengthen its position when pursuing Indonesia’s membership in
the FATF. For the ECW Neloe case, the Center was the first Indonesian authority to
be contacted by the Switzerland authorities about the irregularities and henceforth
discussed the freezing of ECW Neloe’s assets.92 The agreement was organizational
output from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and the Center for Financial Report
and Transaction. Both organizations pushed for the agreement because their routines
tended to employ relatively predictable policies. The agreement also highlighted the
root of the shared responsibility and coordination in intersectoral cooperation, which
is limited. Thus, the two organizations pushed the agreement not only to produce the
desired output for their respective goals but also to strengthen their position at the
domestic level.
Unlike the agreement with Switzerland, which showed horizontal coordination
from relatively equal government organizations, the Russian deal showed vertical
coordination from the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law, and Security to the
Ministry of Law and Human Rights. These organizations did not cooperate to
produce their respective outputs but rather shared the output of combating crimes.
We should note that rather than being a reaction against the existing problem, the
Russian agreement emphasized the anticipation of the future. The securitization
of transnational crimes thus put the agreement under the Coordinating Ministry’s
domain. This development was then followed by the established routine to share the
responsibility among the respective ministries under its coordination, namely, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the political sector and the Ministry of Law and Human
Rights in the justice sector.
Within this backdrop, how would we identify the rationality of the legalization
of the state’s obligation in a treaty? Why does Indonesia prefer to be bound by a
bilateral treaty rather than rely on the informal agency-to-agency mechanism? First,
we should move our analysis away from the binary variance between hard and soft
laws in international agreements. On the basis of Abbott and Snidal’s rationalist–
institutional approach, legalization in international relations could be defined in three
Ibid. 61
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dimensions: (1) precision of provisions, (2) obligation, and (3) delegation to a third
party decision maker.93 These dimensions are continuum to determine the category of
hard law, which refers to the legally binding obligations that were made precisely and
that delegates the authority to interpret and implement the law; and soft law, which is
seen as a residual category that emerges when the legal provisions are weakening in
one or more dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation. However, they argue,
if an agreement does not delegate any authority to a third party to monitor its
implementation or to interpret and enforce it, then the agreement again can be soft
(along a third dimension) because there is no third party providing a focal point
around which parties can reassess their positions; thus the parties can discursively
justify their acts more easily in legalistic terms with less consequence, whether in
terms of reputational costs or other sanctions.94
The three dimensions may help us understand further the choice of design in an
international agreement.95 One particular approach that could be fruitful in examining
the issue at hand is the distributive approach. This approach stands against the
functionalist basis on the prisoner’s dilemma as it “ignores another important obstacle
to successful cooperation: namely, conflicts among states with different interests over
the distribution of the costs and benefits of cooperation.”96 The prisoner’s dilemma
appears to narrow the choices into binary options on whether the state will obey
or violate the agreement. From the game theory lens, international relations have
multiple equilibria, and the state faces the challenge of choosing among many possible
agreements.97 The state can choose from among many status quo scenarios or Pareto
coefficients. In line with this scenario, Shaffer and Pollack argue, “The most important
question is not whether to move toward the Pareto frontier of mutually beneficial
cooperation, but rather which point on the Pareto frontier will be chosen.”98
The efforts to theorize state cooperation have eventually moved toward the
concept of regime complexity and forum shopping. These concepts are based on the
arguments that international cooperation is neither a form of prisoner’s dilemma
not a game as it is a bargaining stage between states. According to Raustiala, regime
complexity is “an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions
governing a particular issue-area.”99 Hence, we may understand that any form of
legal choices made by states is not exclusively based on their functions in resolving
cooperation issues and problems as it is also based on states and various other actors’
preferences about a certain clause in a particular cooperation.100
From this point of view, this article encapsulates four premises:
• The choice of treaty design stems from penal entrepreneurship and institutional
arrangement at the domestic level. In particular, several salient crimes addressed in
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national development planning have contributed to penal institutions’ knowledge
and priorities. Indonesia’s current democratization has been argued to contribute
to the democratization of knowledge insofar as it allows civil society to influence
the decision making process.
• The indirect international criminal law enforcement through MLA and extradition
reflects a bargaining stage between states. In the case study, we might see that
foreign policy and international organization membership priorities appear to
shape the government’s eagerness to enter into bilateral agreements in criminal
matters and limit its prioritization of the implementation issue. As a consequence,
reputation at the international level is crucial in explaining such rationality.
• These findings affirm that the state’s rationality comprises decisions made by
several other collectivities. Rather than solely resorting to the function of resolving
transnational organized crimes or the maxim aut punire aut judicare, these
bilateral treaties reflect a form of institutionalization of the state and nonstate
actors’ preferences in combating crimes at the domestic level. Such is especially
true when the focus is on the decentralization and coordination of responsibilities
among respective institutions.
• Given the high reliance on reciprocity rather than third party enforcement
provision, we could argue that both treaties are soft laws aimed at resolving the
coordination game between countries. The bilateral treaties were formulated
behind the “compliance uncertainty” variable, a situation in which “states are
uncertain what actions count as compliance with treaty obligations.”101 Instead of
the calculation from a binary lens of compliance or cooperation, the treaties were
chosen to safeguard reputational and normative consequences in the future.

VI. Conclusion

This article seeks to explore the state’s rationality in indirect international criminal
law enforcement. We employ the control and consensus model of international
agreement accompanied by a rationalist perspective through the behavioral approach
lens. Notably, we examine Indonesia’s practices in establishing the extradition treaty
with the Russian Federation and the MLA treaty with Switzerland. The case study
reveals that Indonesia applied the consensus model to deal with the former treaty
and the control model to tackle the latter case. However, assessing these decisions
through a rationalist lens conveys that the two instruments hardly reflect a behavior
pattern. Therefore, this article concludes that in international criminal law agreement,
the state’s decision is determined by domestic penal entrepreneurship, that is, the
collectivities among state institutions’ decisions and the politics of crimes are selfreinforced in understanding the rationality of the state.
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